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Abstrakt
Na letních olympijských hrách má Maďarsko dlouhou úspěšnou historii, třebaže výkony jeho komer-
cializovaných globálních týmových sportů v posledních desetiletích podstatně klesají. Přes silnou 
politickou a společenskou dobrou vůli poslat do hry úspěšné profesionální sportovní týmy se trend 
nemění. Tato studie usiluje o popis vlivu vládních dotací na profesionální sportovní výkony a má za cíl 
pochopit, proč se mezi úspěšnými elitními sporty a populárními, „atraktivními“ týmovými sporty ne-
plnícími očekávání (fotbal, basketbal, lední hokej, házená, vodní pólo) v Maďarsku rozevřela velká 
propast. Tento paradox je důležité náležitě chápat jako pojem, abychom lépe porozuměli konkrétním 
mechanismům rozhodování a změn ve sportovní strategii. Náš výzkum posuzuje a analyzuje roli, 
postavení a pozici vládnoucích orgánů systému elitního sportu v Maďarsku od strukturálních reforem 
roku 2010. S podporou maďarského olympijského výboru byl proveden nefinanční audit, jenž podrobil 
rozboru šestnáct upřednostňovaných národních sportovních svazů, a to pomocí rozhovorů s čelnými 
představiteli federací a vyplnění dotazníku odborníky svazů. 
Abstract
Hungary has a long successful history in the Summer Olympics, although the performance of its com-
mercialized global team sports has been decreasing radically in the past decades. Despite the strong 
political and social willingness to field successful professional sports teams, the trend has not chan-
ged. This study attempts to describe the effect of governmental subsidization on professional sport’s 
performance with the aim of understanding why a huge gap has emerged between successful elite 
sports and the popular but underperforming ‘spectacular’ teamsports (football, basketball, ice-hockey, 
handball, water polo) in Hungary. It is important to conceptualize this paradox properly in order to 
better understand the particular mechanisms of decision-making and changes in sport policies. Our 
research reviews and analyses the role, status and position of the governing bodies of the Hungarian 
elite sport system since the structural reforms of 2010. A non-financial audit were conducted with the 
support of the Hungarian Olympic Committee in which the sixteen prioritized national sports fede-
rations were analysed, by interviews with leaders of the federations and filling out a questionnaire by 
experts of the associations.
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INTRODUCTION
Many governments across the world provide extensive funding to their athletes in pursuit of 
success at international competitions such as the Olympic Games. The signiﬁ cant increase in 
governmental resources ﬂ owing into elite sports in recent decades has given rise to a number of 
questions among sport professionals and created a need for understanding the role of the state 
in elite sport (Figure 1.).
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Figure 1: Governmental expenditure on elite sport of the top 20 Olympic medal-winning countries, 
2001–2012 (SPLISS II) (De Bosscher, is Bottenburg, Shibli, Westerbeek, 2013)
With the fact that the Hungarian government declared sport a strategic sector in 2010 while 
assigning signiﬁ cant additional resources to this area (see Table 1, Table 4, Table 5), Hungary 
also joined the phenomenon of the global sporting arms race as described in the international 
literature (De Bosscher, Bingham, Shibli, Bottenburg, De Knop, 2008).
Table 1: The expenditure from the Hungarian budget for sports and leisure activities and services 
(billions of HUF)
2003–2007 
(average)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
The expenditure from the Hungarian budget 
for sports and leisure activities and services
31,2 68.1 61.9 69.2 73.4 168.6
Percentage of the budget 0,33% 0,5% 0,45% 0.46% 0.44% 0.99%
Hungary has a long successful history in the Summer Olympics, although the performance 
of its commercialized global team sports has been decreasing radically in the past decades (Ta-
ble 2, 3). Despite the strong political and social willingness to ﬁ eld successful professional sports 
teams, the trend has not changed. This study attempts to describe the eﬀ ect of governmental 
subsidization on professional sport’s performance with the aim of understanding why a huge gap 
has emerged between successful elite sports and the popular but underperforming ‘spectacular’ 
teamsports (football, basketball, ice-hockey, handball, water polo). It is important to conceptual-
ize this paradox properly in order to better understand the eﬀ ect of the particular mechanisms 
in sport policies and to implement successful sport development policies (Sterbenz & Gulyás 
& Kassay, 2014). 
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Table 2: Medal table of Summer Olympic
Medal table of Summer Olympics
1 1952 1972 1992 2012
2 USA URS EUN USA 
2 URS USA USA CHN
3 HUN DDR GER GBR
4 GER CHN RUS
5 JPN CUB KOR 
6 AUS ESP GER
7 POL KOR FRA
8 HUN HUN ITA
9 HUN
Table 3: 
Football Basketball Ice hockey Handball Water polo
1950’ World Championship 
– 2nd
European 
Champion
n. q. – Olympic Champions
2010 n. q. for WC n. q. for WC Division I B 
2nd 
n. q. World 
Championship – 4th
2011 – n. q. for EC Divison I A 
2nd (18)
World 
Championship – 7th
European 
Championship – 3rd
2012 n. q. for EC n. q. for OC Division I A 
3rd (19)
London – 4th London – 5th
2013 – n. q. for EC Division I A 
3rd (19)
World 
Championship – 8th
World Champion
The present study examines the eﬀ ect of the changed role of Hungarian government in elite 
sport and the inﬂ uence of the newly implemented political incentive on the behaviour of sport or-
ganizations. The nature of this study is descriptive, so our goal is not to evaluate the unprecedented 
level of support of the Hungarian government for sport, but rather to explore the principles for 
eﬃ  cient allocation of resources and to raise attention for the threats of the existing system.
Governmental sport ﬁ nancing system in Hungary
The Hungarian government introduced a new corporate tax relief system (TRS) for the ﬁ ve 
most popular team sports (football, basketball, ice-hockey, handball and water polo) to solve the 
ﬁ nancing problems in 2010. This new method of sport funding has been authorized with an aim 
to use these additional resources primarily with the purposes of development of youth and sport 
facility investment. 
Its introduction established a combination of coordination mechanisms. In this form, the mar-
ket elements (ﬂ ow of resources from businesses to sports organizations, for example, sponsorship) 
are mixed with the characteristics of bureaucratic coordination (decisions of actors standing in 
hierarchical relation determine the available limits). These together created a mixture, as business 
organizations can directly allocate a given part (70%) of their corporate income tax to sports 
organizations. In this system, a hierarchical bureaucratic coordination mechanism is used with 
the state and federation approval of sports development programs, while the company is paying 
like in the market coordination horizontally, but without the consideration their support to the 
sports organizations (Figure 2).
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Figure 2: The model of the tax relief system (Gulyás & Sterbenz, 2014)
The federations set a quota based on the development programs used by the clubs, and the 
federations have a budget constraint set by the state (Table 4).
Table 4: Amounts which came from the tax relief system between 2011–2013 (in 1,000s of EUR) (own ed.)
2011/12 2012/13
Football 66 667 71 000
Basketball 11 667 17 000
Water polo 7433 16 000
Handball 20 000 25 333
Ice hockey 7 967 12 667
HOC 400 500
Total 114 133 142 500
The government introduced another funding construction for sixteen prioritized sports in 2013 
to compensate for the emerging distortion between diﬀ erent sports after the implementation of 
TRS. In addition, at the same time the state also undertook the debt of several sports federations 
as had previously happened two times in the 1990s (Table 5).
Table 5: Allocated governmental funding for the sixteen prioritised sports (own ed.)
Federation 2013 2014–2020 Per year %
Athletics 1 048 60 000 8 571 818%
Boxing (amateur) 984 19 000 2 714 276%
Canoeing 1 121 44 667 6 381 569%
Cycling 315 9 333 1 333 424%
Rowing 311 32 000 4 571 1470%
Fencing 1 005 32 000 4 571 455%
Gymnastics 984 16 333 2 333 237%
Judo 835 36 667 5 238 628%
Modern Pentathlon 1 016 31 667 4 524 445%
Shooting 218 16 333 2 333 1069%
Swimming 2 455 47 000 6 714 273%
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Federation 2013 2014–2020 Per year %
Table tennis 146 9 000 1 286 883%
Volleyball 398 14 000 2 000 502%
Wrestling 1 650 48 333 6 905 418%
Tennis 358 13 667 1 952 545%
Skating 704 10 000 1 429 203%
Sum 15 563 440 000 62 857 404%
Sport infrastructure 14 280
Coaching programme 259
Previous studies have showed that as more countries have developed a strategic planning 
process for increasing their national elite sporting achievement, the return on investment has 
decreased for many nations (De Bosscher, Shilbury, Theeboom, Hoecke, De Knop 2011). The 
question raised at once weather this increasing invested amounts of money in the Hungarian 
elite sport it is enough for achieving greater elite sport success. On the other hand these new 
governmental ﬁ nancing constructions were accompanied with a strong centralization process of 
the sport policy system which can be a serious threat for the professional team sports and can 
lead to ineﬃ  ciency. 
These kinds of structures were characterised by the Soviet-type economies (STE) where the 
incentive structure did not encourage cost minimization and innovation in the production sector 
but emphasised meeting output quotas (Eggertsson et al., 1990). The hierarchical central manage-
ment structure works best when:
1. ﬁ nal outputs have relatively few quality dimensions;
2. the vertical phases of processing a commodity are few;
3. there are substantial economies of scale at the enterprise level;
4. the technology does not require horizontal linkages between enterprises with each unit acting 
as both supplier and purchaser of inputs.
To transform it to the sport sector we assume that hierarchical and bureaucratic coordination 
can be eﬀ ective for the individual-based sport where production does not require horizontal link-
age, but is measurable in objective and absolute terms, but not for professional team sport where 
the performance can be measured only in relative terms and it includes several uncertain factors 
(Sally & Anderson et al., 2014).
The other problem is that such a signiﬁ cant state funding is softening the budget constrain. The 
soft budget constraint is an economic concept originally formulated by Kornai (1979, 1980a,b, 
1986, 2003). The SBC describes economic behaviour in socialist or post-socialist economies 
marked by ineﬃ  ciency and shortage (Kornai et al., 2003). Although the soft budget constraint is 
particularly persistent in socialist economies, it can also appear in other economic environments. 
The budget constraint refers to the behaviour of the decision-maker: he uses his budget, which he 
receives from selling his output, to cover his expenses (Kornai, 1986). The soft budget constraint 
is appear when an organization faces the possibility of negotiating reﬁ nancing, credits or subsidies 
ex post (Kornai et al., 2003, p. 1104), so the strict relationship between expenditure and earn-
ings depreciate, deriving from the unenforceability of bankruptcy threats, together with various 
subsidies, credits, and price-supports (Kornai, 1979, 1980a). Enterprises had strong chances for 
survival because they could always count on bailouts, which left their mark on their behaviour 
(Kornai et al., 2003). 
Storm and Nielsen (2012, p. 191.) analysed the prevalence of the SBCs in the European 
professional football, and they stated the emergence and persistence of the SBC syndrome in 
professional sport is due to two main, interconnected factors: (1) the institutional mechanism of 
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the sport market and (2) the social attachment to the clubs linked to the speciﬁ c emotional logic 
of sport, which focuses on winning.
METHODS
A wide range of studies were conducted with the support of the Hungarian Olympic Committee 
in which the sixteen prioritized national sports federations (Athletics Boxing (amateur) Canoe-
ing, Cycling, Rowing, Fencing, Gymnastics, Judo, Modern Pentathlon, Shooting, Swimming, 
Table tennis, Volleyball, Wrestling, Tennis, Skating) were analysed. Data collection was based on 
an overall organizational questionnaire including 48 items of 6 topics (Organization & Strategy; 
Development; Education; Support & Communication; Medical; and Facilities) with the involve-
ment of the main stakeholders within national sport federations. The results of this survey were 
compared to the results of one of our former researches which examined the ﬁ ve team sports 
which receive strong ﬁ nancial support through the corporate tax relief system. 
RESULTS
The conducted vocational audit has showed that on average over 70% of the revenues of the 
investigated sport federation are coming from governmental resources; most of the federations 
have vanishing sponsorship incomes. The historical results and recent successes show that the 
strong state funding for individual elite sport is an eﬃ  cient tool and we can conﬁ rm our previous 
assumption. 
In case of team sport’s funding system the empirical evidences have pointed out that the in-
troduced method involves many hazards in addition to solving the ﬁ nancing problems.
1. Re-spreading of the SBC: 
 A failure to understand the upper ﬁ nancial constraints of sport development programs is 
encouraging relevant actors in political bargaining and may lead to the re-spreading of soft 
budget constraints well known from the socialist planned economy. A lack of or a variable 
upper limit may result in the marginalization of the management responsible, since there is no 
“price” for the obtainable resources. This behaviour is particularly dangerous in an industry 
such as sports, where the actors become particularly susceptible to the irrational escalation 
trap with their participation in a sport competition (Mérő, 2013).
 − Since bureaucratic relations distort the eﬃ  ciency of the price system (Hayek, 1976), such 
a ﬁ nancing model is spreading for sports which basically operate under a market coor-
dination model, which breaks down performance-driven economic logic from the daily 
practice of the sports. According to Milgrom (1993), the market system does not require 
the transmission of detailed information about resource availability, consumer preferences, 
or technological opportunities. The prices provide as much information as is needed, and 
the market system achieves eﬀ ective coordination with much less communication of non-
price information than the centralized, planned system uses. 
 − Sports organizations which are not aware of the constraint or continue softening it with 
political bargaining can abuse the support of fans, similar to the “too big to fail” phenom-
enon known from the banking world. Clubs whose operations are deemed ’too important’ 
subject their stakeholders to the irresponsible practices of its management.’ The functioning 
of the club is set as “too important” that the consequences of irresponsible management 
have been subjecting to them. The sports federations are not interested in the rigorous 
treatment, since the decisions (Board) are made by the sports organizations themselves.
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2. The risk of the appearance of corruption: 
 Since control of TRS-ﬁ nance is a bureaucratic type task as it is belonging to the government 
and sport federation, the fraud, the sources “inﬁ ltration” of non-supported areas (professional 
players’ salaries), and the expansion of corruption inevitably appear. The reduction of these 
could be realised with the tightening of controls and more severe penalties in the short-term, 
but cannot be removed due to the logic of the system. In contrast to the long-term results of 
youth development, short-term proﬁ t maximization stands as a stronger motivation which will 
endanger the achievement of the TRS’s objectives.
3. The crowding out eﬀ ect of other revenue sources
 The introduction of the resources from TRS appeared not only as additional resources as was 
hoped, but also as a substitution eﬀ ect to replace previous revenues with the marginalization 
of sponsorship. The dangers of bureaucratic coordination are the depreciation of competition 
and the role of inventions, gaining of income without performance, shirking behaviour appear. 
In case of rational decision-makers are expected to appear on the moral hazard phenomenon, 
these previously rationally behaving, frugal sports leaders will tend to change their behaviour. 
Figure 3: The typical revenue structures of Hungarian and top international football clubs (Source: 
Deloitte, 2014; Muszbek, 2013)
 Muszbek’s (2013) analysis about the economic situation of Hungarian football shows that the 
Hungarian top football league’s ﬁ ve-year cumulative loss is 34 million euros, and aside from 
2010, a loss was made every year. Revenues are growing more slowly than costs, with an aver-
age annual loss of 25% of expenditures. An increasing proportion of income is coming from 
non-market-based resources, and in some cases, from the governmental budget or even public 
resources. Nearly two thirds of the spending (about 32 million euro) is labour cost (i. e. salary, 
commission fee). The clubs do not have a business strategy that seeks to achieve the level of 
international competitiveness in terms of budget (minimum 15 million EUR) as playing in 
the domestic league does not require on average 4 million euros of cost.
4. Rent-seeking
 One of the important social impacts of government regulation is that actors are encouraged 
to change rules which are not favourable to them. Rent-seeking occurs when the beneﬁ ts do 
not arise in a natural way (for example, changes in supply and demand), but are artiﬁ cially 
created such as with state regulations, and competition starts to rise for the rent. In this case, 
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the resources that the companies and organizations are spending to get the annuity are socially 
wasteful (Tollison, 1982).
 In the case of TRS, the sport lobby completely and rationally strives to inﬂ uence legislation 
for the success of rent-seeking, and this is particularly motivated for it because of the known 
time frames of the system. Because of the uncertainty surrounding this policy (the European 
Commission approved this method of sport ﬁ nancing for the Hungarian government until 
2017), the participants, contrary to the values  of sport, are interested, rationally, in short-term 
revenue increases rather than in the operation of real sports development programs. For the 
development of youth it is essential to create a culture in which cooperation can be a dominant 
strategy against the competition.
CONCLUSION
Our study also conﬁ rmed one of the main results obtained under the SPLISS research, which 
is that the increase in resources for sport does not lead to a clear improvement in sporting perfor-
mance, and thus, does not support the competitiveness of elite sport. Hungary, with a state-funding 
dominant-system, seems to be more eﬀ ective in the case of individualistic sports where a direct 
connection can be identiﬁ ed between eﬀ ort and performance. The same incentive system cannot 
be eﬃ  cient for team sports where several factors which increase the complexity of the sport can 
be identiﬁ ed, so the trade-oﬀ  between eﬀ ort and performance is not so straightforward.
State funding can be eﬃ  cient for individual-based sports where performance is measurable in 
objective and absolute terms. On the contrary, in the case of team sports only the market is able to 
create such an asymmetric and hard ﬁ nancing system which leads to an eﬃ  cient long-term usage 
of resources. The state has to take into account fairness as well. Further studies should be carried 
out regarding the relationship between state and market in terms of their ﬁ nancing role in sport. 
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